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Abstract
The Banking Union, the Economic and Monetary Union's main reform during
the recent crisis, is still unfinished without its third pillar, the European Deposit
Insurance Scheme. The first two pillars have already ensured that the supervision
and resolution of the banks are on the European level. However, the common
deposit insurance is still a necessary element to fulfil the Banking Union's objective,
to plausibly break the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and their domestic
banking sector.
This reform, to effectively protect the depositors in the euro area, was put on
hold because of the fear of many European member states that it would induce moral
hazard and excessive risk-taking. Moral hazard in this setting means that both the
member states and banks interests and behaviour may change in an undesirable way
since the cost of bank failures will be socialized. In my thesis, I analyse the most
favorable, but still attainable options of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme,
and the ways to mitigate its drawbacks. In the analysis, I suggest feasible alterna-
tives, necessary measures to lessen moral hazard, and inevitable fiscal back-stops to
ensure the credibility of a common scheme.
Keywords Banking regulation; banking; European Deposit Insurance Scheme;
EDIS; national deposit insurance; moral hazard; fiscal back-stop
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1 Introduction
One of the main reason why European countries were seriously affected during the re-
cent crisis is the strong adverse feedback loop between banks and sovereigns (Véron,
2015). Failing banking sector jeopardizes the euro area member states mainly due
to the costly bailouts, while on the other hand, unsustainably high public debt
endangers banking sector because of their domestic exposure.
Europe's answer was the banking union to break this vicious banks-sovereign
circle. The initiated main ways to achieve it are to transfer the responsibility of
supervision to supranational level and to pool risks regarding to the resolution and
deposit insurance. From these, the common supervision, the Single Supervisory
Mechanism, and the common resolution, the Single Resolution Mechanism were
already implemented (Véron, 2015). However, the intended third pillar, the common
deposit insurance scheme has not been installed yet. The banking union will remain
unfinished until this function is not transferred from national to supranational level
since in a major crisis, bank failures and the related deposit payouts can put at risk
the sovereigns. Another important long-term objective of the banking union is to
decrease the fragmentation of the banking sector in the euro area. For this purpose,
the common deposit insurance is indispensable.
Deposits are not only the main part of the households' financial assets, but
also one of the most important source of the banks' funding in the eurozone (Euro-
pean Comission, 2015). Because of the different maturity structure of the assets and
liabilities in the banks' balance sheet, even the otherwise solvent banks are exposed
to bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). The bank runs can seriously affect the
whole economy and the sustainability of the public debt. Therefore, deposit insur-
ance is a necessary part of every major economy's safety net. Deposit insurance
schemes sole obligation is to protect deposits by paying out depositors and partic-
ipating in resolution in case of bank failures. A credible deposit insurance by its
pure existence is capable to stop bank panic by removing the depositors' incentives
to withdraw in bank panics. Thus, the deposit insurance schemes have dual role
both in crisis management and crisis prevention.
Nevertheless, in the recent crisis, the current system of national deposit in-
surance schemes were not able to fully prevent and stop bank panics in all the euro
area countries (Gros & Schoenmaker, 2014). As the viability of the member states
were questioned, also the credibility of the deposit insurance schemes is decreased.
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Without adequate size and risk pooling on the European level, deposit insurance
will remain a weak part of the banking sector's safety net. A further reason why the
current system of deposit insurance is unjustifiable is the lack of consistency between
it and the supranational supervision of banks. These two systems on different levels
can cause several conflicts inside the euro area.
The European Commission has realized the need for a common deposit insur-
ance hence it proposed the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (European Com-
mission, 2015). This scheme, after an 8-year transitional period with continuously
increasing risk-sharing, would have a steady-state full insurance system. This full
insurance means that the national responsibilities of deposit protection would be
entirely transferred to European level. Nevertheless, this proposal has met the
resistance of many member states (Véron, 2015). They fear that this degree of risk-
sharing would induce reckless behaviour both from the side of banks and member
states.
In my thesis, I analyse the alternatives of a common deposit insurance scheme.
I use the theoretical framework of deposit insurance presented by Diamond and Dy-
bvig (1983) and model of moral hazard by Freixas and Rochet (2008). I compare
the alternatives according to the pre-determined objectives. I also discuss exten-
sively the problem of moral hazard and the possible ways to mitigate it. Moreover,
I emphasize the need for a credible fiscal back-stop and the possible options to
accomplish it.
Furthermore, I discuss the economically relevant questions about the im-
plementation. I mainly pay attention to governance, transition and scope of the
common deposit insurance scheme to find the most incentive compatible ways of
implementation.
My topic has high practical relevance since a common scheme would mean
substantial improvement in the current European crisis management framework and
would be a significant step toward a more integrated Economic and Monetary Union.
Currently, the proposal of the European Commission is under discussion without any
specified launching date.
This thesis is organized as follows: section 2 overview the theoretical literature
of financial intermediation, deposit insurance, contagion and moral hazard. Section 3
concentrates on the introduction of the empirical findings about the effects of deposit
insurance. Section 4 gives an overall introduction of the deposit insurance schemes
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and their features. Section 5 is about the current system of deposit insurance in
Europe, the effects of the recent crisis and the banking union. Section 6 and 7 list
the objectives and the prerequisites of a common scheme. Section 8 and 9 discuss
and compare the relevant policy options. In section 10, I discuss the implementation
of a common scheme, while finally in section 11, I conclude the thesis.
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2 Literature review
In this section I will review the theory of deposit insurance and insurance pools.
The study of deposit insurance and bank runs has been a topic that has interested
economists for a long time. Questions such as deposit insurance makes financial
markets safer by preventing bank runs or indeed it makes them more dangerous by
stimulating banks to take more risks are very difficult to answer. Fortunately, several
scholars dealt with these questions. Furthermore, I will analyse the theoretical
model of the moral hazard of deposit insurance in a way to draw conclusions for the
insurance of the national deposit insurance schemes.
2.1 Delegated monitoring and financial intermediaries
Banks and other financial intermediaries are the main source of external funds for
the agents in the economy (Allen & Gale, 2007) and that's why it is important to
understand their functioning.
Arrow and Debreu (1954) developed their general equilibrium model where
they included time and uncertainty under the assumption of perfect competition
(perfect monitoring, information and enforcement of contracts). Bankruptcy is as-
sumed away through perfect monitoring (Arrow & Debreu, 1954) In the model, the
so-called Arrow-Debreu securities are time and state dependent contingent claims.
When these securities exist for all combinations of goods, time and state, then the
two Walrasian welfare theorem holds. The contemporary financial theories differ
from this model in that some of the above key assumptions do not hold. There
can be incomplete contracts thus information frictions and bankruptcies are possi-
ble. Freixas and Rochet's (2008) example for incomplete contracts is that a firm's
bankruptcy may trigger a bargaining process involving the claim holders. Diamond's
(1984) model differs from Arrow and Debreu's model since contracts can be incom-
plete and non-verifiable. In the model of Diamond (1984), the sources of the bank's
competitive advantages are the reduced monitoring costs and the diversification of
loans within financial intermediation as shown in the model of delegated monitoring.
First let's understand the importance of delegated monitoring. Consider a
borrower and many lenders. There is a cost of monitoring K and savings from
monitoring S since monitoring allows for improved contracts. Without monitoring
the borrower can simply inflate costs and report zero profit regardless of the value of
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her project. The only sanction available for the lenders to enforce profit-sharing is
liquidation, however extremely costly it is. The optimal contract without monitoring
would mean that when no or small profits are reported the lenders would decide to
liquidate the borrower's project rather than accept any payoff. Thus, the necessity
of liquidation when the project is unsuccessful creates inefficiencies compared to
monitoring since the optimal contract with monitoring on the other hand would
ensure that the lenders don't have to liquidate. The reason is that they can observe
whether the project is successful or not, and when no or small profit is reported the
lenders would simply accept as much payoff as the firm can pay  which is more
than if they would choose costly liquidation.
Now let's assume that each lender's capital to invest is small relative to the
amount needed to fund the borrower's investment. There are multiple lenders per
borrower m, so the total cost of monitoring is m ·K. Whether the monitoring has
been undertaken or not is the agent's private information thus the monitoring now
is unverifiable and costly.
Financial intermediaries can be a solution for the above problem through
delegated monitoring. In the model, monitoring is outsourced for intermediaries
and they are now basically synthetic large investors without monitored by lenders/
depositors. The cost of outsourcing should be less than the cost of m ·K which is
indeed the case when there are many investors with small amount of capital. K+D
≤ min[S,m ·K], where D denote delegation cost per borrower.
However, in this case diversification of intermediaries' loans are also critically
important since a one loan bank would face the same incentives as the large borrower
to report only zero profit. An example from Diamond (1996) helps us to easily see
the benefits of diversification.
The value V of a project can be either high H (highly profitable) or low L
(no profit, borrower can repay only the capital) with given distribution of success
Table 1: Distribution of V
H P=0.8
L 1-P=0.2
(see the table on the right) (Diamond, 1996). If there is a
one loan bank, which is not monitored, the probability of
a bank failure is 0.2 since the bank will be able to repay
only the initial capital without interest to the lenders
and it will be liquidated. This is the same as if the
lenders would directly invest into the project. However,
consider now that the bank raises capital to fund two independent investments. In
this case, the bank can face three outcomes with the following probability: both loans
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turn out to be successful 2P = 0.64, only one of the loans is successful 2(1−P )P =
0.32 or both loans are unsuccessful 2(1 − P ) = 0.04. From these scenarios, even if
one of the investments is successful, it ensures sufficient fund for the bank to cover
its liabilities (borrowed amount plus interest after the two loans). Thus, the chance
of bank failure is only 0.04 compared to the earlier 0.2 in the one investment case.
In Diamond (1984)'s model, as the banks increase the number of investments, the
chance of liquidation decreases.
The Diamond (1984) article has important implications. Diversification makes
bank deposits safer than bank loans. If we assume fully diversified banks with inde-
pendently distributed loans, the bank's deposits become almost riskless which would
imply no need for deposit insurance. However, it is not the case in every model as
I will introduce Diamond and Dybvig (1983)'s article in the following chapter.
2.2 Multiple equilibria of the bank deposit contract
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) article laid down the theoretical foundations of a de-
posit insurance.
Their analysis focuses on the multiple equilibria of the bank demand deposit
contracts due to the maturity transformation service provided by the banks. They
show that bank demand deposits can improve on an exchange market by providing
better risk-sharing among lenders who need to consume at a different random times
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). However, the demand deposit contract providing this
improvement can have an undesirable equilibrium (a bank run) in which depositors
panic and all of them withdraw immediately, including those who would prefer to
keep their money in and consume later if they weren't concerned about the bank
failing. The authors argue that even a rational depositor would withdraw in bad
equilibria. Unfortunately, a bank run could cause that many healthy banks, which
would be solvent on the long run, would fail, which cause banking crises and real
economic problems since loans will be recalled and even solvent banks can fail which
would further deepen the crisis.
Consider three time periods (T = 0, 1, 2), a single homogeneous good and
productive technology with R > 1 unit of output in T = 2 for each unit input
invested in T = 0. In the case when this productive production is interrupted in the
first period, the liquidation value is just the initial investment 1. It is important to
note that the liquidation is inefficient for the economy.
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The banks' role in the model is that they are able to transform illiquid assets
(productive technology) by offering liabilities with a different, smoother pattern of
returns over time than the illiquid assets offer (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
The agents learn their type in period 1, and type 1 (2) agents excessively care
only about consumption in T = 1(2). Thus, letting ci
k
be consumption in period
k of an agent who is of type i, the payoff for agents are the following: c11 = 1,
c12 = c
2
1 = 0, c
2
2 = R. Further part of the asymmetric information problem is that
agents can privately store at no cost.
The share of type 1 consumers is t. Let cT represent goods to store or consume
by agent in period T.
U(c1, c2; θ) =
{
u(c1) if j is of type 1 in state θ
u(c1 + c2) if j is of type 2 in state θ
]
where u : /R++ → /R is twice continuously differentiable, increasing, strictly
concave, and satisfies Inada conditions u′(∞) = 0 and u′(0) =∞.
The first best would be possible if types were publicly observable. In an
optimal insurance contract
u′(c1∗1 ) = p ·R · u
′(c2∗2 )
where 1 ≥ p > R−1, marginal utility is equal to marginal productivity, and
t · c1∗1 + [(1− t)c
2∗
2 /R] = 1
the resource constraint. Since pR > 1, and relative risk aversion exceeds 1, the
above two equation implies that in optimum the consumption level is c1∗1 > 1 and
c2∗2 < R. Hence, there is room for improvement compared to the competitive market
equilibrium (c11 = 1, c
2
2 = R). The banks can offer this improvement. They, in this
model, provide an insurance in case of being a type 1 agent. The banks' demand
deposit contract offer r1 return for type 1 agents.
An important property of the demand deposit contract is the sequential ser-
vice constraint which specifies that bank's payoff1 to any agent can depend only on
the agent's place in line (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
1The demand deposit contract's payoff function is Vt, which shows period t payoff per unit
depending on the agent's place in line.
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In this demand deposit contract setting, there are two pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. First, the good equilibrium, which provides optimal risk-sharing, is
when r1 = c1∗1 and type 1 agents withdraw at T = 1 while type 2 agents wait. The
other, bad equilibrium (bank run) is when all agents panic and try to withdraw at
T = 1. This bad equilibrium provides an allocation that is worse for every agent
since all the productive technology R > 1 production is interrupted. In T = 2, the
depositors who did not withdraw in T = 1 won't receive the high return because
the reserves of the bank are exhausted. The necessary condition r1 > 1, to improve
on the competitive market equilibrium, makes the banks susceptible to run. This is
because the face value of deposits is larger than the liquidation value of the bank's
asset (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). The reasoning behind the fact that there are two
equilibriums is that agents choose to deposit even when there is a chance of bank
run, if the probability of it is small enough.
The solutions that can prevent bank runs are the following ones: (i) suspen-
sion of convertibility and (ii) government deposit insurance.
(i) If banks can suspend convertibility when there are too many withdrawals in
T = 1, then the anticipation of this suspension prevents runs by removing the
incentive of type 2 agents to withdraw early. The mechanism of suspension of
convertibility is that the banks can fix an upper bound of withdrawals t = fˆ .
Since, early withdrawals receive strictly smaller payoff than they would get in
the second period and a fund is still there for type 2 agents, these agents won't
withdraw in the first period. The main problem with this method is that when
t is stochastic then suspension of convertibility won't be optimal since when
even the ex-ante determined upper bound is achieved fˆ , t still can be t > fˆ . In
this case, when the upper limit was reached, no other agent can withdraw even
though there are some type 1 agents not withdrew yet. Cross-border capital
controls are considered a weaker, although in most cases longer lasting, form
of suspension of convertibility (Ostry et al., 2012).
(ii) The idea of the deposit insurance is that it guarantees that the promised
V1(fj , r1) =
{
r1 if fj < r
−1
1
0 if fj ≥ r
−1
1
]
and
V2(f, r1) = max
{
R(1− r1f)
(1− f)
, 0
}
,
where f is the total number of demand deposits withdrawn and fj is the number of withdrawers'
deposits serviced before agent j as a fraction of total demand deposits.
12
returns will be paid to all agents regardless of the period in which they with-
draw. In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)'s model, the government is assumed
to be able to levy any tax that would charge every agent the same amount.
This means that the government would tax those agents who withdrew in
T = 1. The rate of tax depends on f and r1.
Compared to suspension of convertibility, the government deposit insurance
also works when t is stochastic. So, the demand deposit contract with government
deposit insurance represents a dominant strategy equilibrium. Thus, it increases
depositors' confidence, prevents bank runs and brings bank stability.
However, bank runs are not just panic based can be but also as a result of
aggregate loan risk and asymmetric information about loan payoffs (Bryant, 1980).
Both in Bryant (1980)'s and Diamond and Dybvig (1983)'s article the consumers
have random liquidity demands, and the deposit contract insures them against this
risk.
In Bryant (1980)'s model, there are two types of individuals who live two
periods. The number of type one (two) individuals is N(z) = N (n(z) = n) for all
z ∈ [0, 1], where N > n. The difference between the two type of individuals that the
type ones are endowed with NK > 0 units of single non-storable but transferable
consumption good in their first period of life but with nothing in T = 2. The type
twos are endowed with nK > 0 in T = 2 but with nothing in T = 1.
Furthermore, the author introduces similar uninsurable demand for liquidity
as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) thus α percent of deposits should be held as fiat
money by the bank to be able to pay out the early withdrawers. This way, again
similarly to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the intermediary reduces the idiosyncratic
risk faced by individuals by the deposit contract.
A different point in Bryant (1980)'s work is that intermediary assets are risky.
The type two individuals' endowment is risky: it can be less than nK > 0 with small
probabilty. This riskiness is reflected in the loan- and deposits rates too. The author
assumes that β percentage of type one individuals will realize when the bad outcomel
happens. These individuals react by withdrawing their money similarly to those α
individuals who affected by the idiosyncratic liquidity shock. This will cause a bank
run since the banks only keep α and not α + β percent as reserves.
According to Bryant (1980), the value of the government deposit insurance is
in that it is more favorable for the society that the government occasionally prints
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money and handles the crisis than for intermediaries to store α+β percent as reserves
in every period.
The main difference between the two above articels is that in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) the crises is originated solely from a random panic while in Bryant
(1980) from the problematic intermediary assets. This difference has further con-
sequnces for the policy makers. In the first case, there should be no cost for the
government from the deposit insurance since the banks only need liqudity. In the
second case, when there is insolvency, there are fiscal costs for the state.
In addition to the deposit insurance, another measure to decrease the chances
of a bank run is to increase the capital requirements of the banks (Freixas & Rochet,
2008). Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that equity only seems to be more expensive
for the banks because of the government subsidies, such as deposit insurance, enable
them to borrow at lower costs rather than to increase their equity. The authors claim
that capital regulation is an effective way to counter incentives for recklessness and
decrease excessive leverage. They recommend equity requirements be set at 30 per
cent of bank's total assets (Admati & Hellwig, 2013).
It is worth mentioning that also a well functioning interbank markets can
provide a solution to stop bank runs when the solvency of the bank is not in question
and there is trust in the financial system (Freixas & Rochet, 2008). However, as we
will see in the next chapter, interbank markets can be the source of the problem
too. Similarly to the interbank markets, the LOLR function's of the central bank
can help to stop bank runs with providing liqudity but only when the banks are
solvent.
2.3 Contagion between financial intermediaries
Allen and Gale (2000) provides the microeconomic foundations of failure of solvent
banks due to interbank contagion in incomplete market structure. They use similar
setting as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)'s article. However, unlike to it, in Allen
and Gale (2000)'s model there are more banks. The authors highlight that in their
model the incompleteness of the market structure plays a significant role in the
bank runs. The model can be applied not only to banks but also to member states'
financial sector in an incomplete monetary union. In an incomplete monetary union,
banks reside with substantial cross-border activity in the member states, however
in a crisis the capital and liquidity flow would halt or even restricted by member
14
states.
In Allen and Gale's model, there are four banks (or interchangeably member
states' financial sector). A liquidity shock occurs in one of the regions and it spreads
by the incomplete pattern of the linkages in the interbank market. In the paper,
the authors make a distinction between the complete market structure (i.e. every
bank/state has exposure to all other banks/states) and incomplete market structure
(i.e. banks/states are exposed only to neighbouring bank/state) (Allen & Gale,
2000).
Consider three dates T = 0, 1, 2 and a single good, which can be consumed
and invested in two types of assets (in a liquid and an illiquid asset). The liquidation
value of the illiquid asset is r < 1.
In Allen and Gale (2000) the four ex ante identical member states have a
continuum of ex ante identical consumers. First, endowment is equal to one unit of
good at T = 0 and the utility function is
U(c1, c2) =
{
(u(c1) with probability ω
u(c2) with probability 1− ω
]
where ct denotes consumption at date T = 1, 2.
In the equation, the probability ω varies across member states' financial sector
and denote the probability of being an early consumer. ω has two type of possible
values, a high ωH and ωL.
There are two equally likely situation S1 and S2. The difference between the
situation is the distribution of the level of liquidity shock (early and late consumers)
ω.
The optimal risk-sharing in this setting is achievable even when the planner
cannot observe the consumers' type since the first best allocation maximise the
objective function γ · u(c1) + (1 − γ) · u(c2), where γ = (ωH + ωL)/2, subject to
the feasibility constraint x + y ≤ 1, resource constrains T = 1 : γ · c1 < y and
T = 2 : (1− γ)c2 ≤ R · x, and incentive constraint c1 ≤ c2.
However, this incentive-efficient allocation cannot be achieved in decentral-
ized setting because of the distribution of ω. In this setting, the banks make the
investment decisions since each consumer deposits her endowment of one unit of
consumption good in the banks. The banks invest and offer deposit contract (ci1, c
i
2)
15
that allows the depositor to withdraw either ci1 units of consumption at period 1 or
ci2 at period 2. The above investment portfolio satisfies the bank's budget constraint
x + y ≤ 1 at T = 1, however it will not satisfy the budget constraint at the second
date. Unlike the planner, the bank must consider the case that the fraction of early
consumers in his region is high ωH and it will need more than y to satisfy the early
consumers and has to liquidate some of its illiquid asset for r. A bank must keep at
least (ωH)c1/R units of the long asset to satisfy the late consumers. However, when
r, the liquidation value is small enough, it can cause bank runs since there won't
be enough buffer to satisfy the needs of late consumers c2. The amount of the long
asset that can be used as a buffer at period 1 is r
(
x− (ωH)c1
R
, 0
)
without causing a
bank run.
The interbank market can be the solution for the above problem. Hence the
average probability of different type of consumers is γ = (ωH + ωL)/2, there will
be states with low number of early consumer ωL who can help the ωH states with
liquidity even in case of an incomplete market structure.
Now consider a case when there is a third state S, which occurs with negligible
probability so the agents don't plan with it. This represents the financial fragility
in the system since in this case the demand for liquidity in T = 1 is greater than
the banks' ability to supply it without causing a run. In this case, it will be easy
to see the fragility of the incomplete market structure. First, there is an initial
shock in region A. There is insufficient buffer, and if the shock  is enough great and
the liquidation value r is enough small the bank A will go bankrupt. Since bank
B has claims from bank A, bank C from bank B and bank D from bank C, the
failure of one bank will cause the failure of the whole banking system. However, in a
complete market structure this failure would happen with smaller probability since
each region is connected to all other regions and they can jointly provide liquidity to
the affected region. In case of incomplete market structure, the vicious circle could
be break with the help of liquidity assistance.
The contagion effect is the reason that even one bank's or a member state's
financial sector's failure can be extremely costly since it can trigger other banks or
member states' financial sectors to fail. In the literature, there are many different
ways suggested how contagion might happen. Above I described one example by
Allen and Gale (2000) in which contagion arises from the overlapping claims in the
banking sector. A further examples of source of contagion is from Ferrucci, Gianluigi,
& Shin (2005). Their model incorporates direct balance sheet interlinkages among
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financial institutions and contagion via sudden drop in asset prices. They extensively
focus on the later channel. After an initial shock, changes in asset prices can induce
disposal of assets, which, if the market's demand is not perfectly elastic, will have
further negative impact on market prices, thereby again deteriorating the financial
intermediaries position. Thus, contagion can result even from relatively small shocks
adversely affecting asset prices.
2.4 Moral hazard and deposit insurance
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) states that deposit insurance has no cost but as
(Freixas & Rochet, 2008) pointed out there is a moral hazard problem with this
type of government insurance. Moral hazard occurs when the provision of insurance
changes the individual's behaviour in an undesirable way. In the case of deposit in-
surance, the incentive of the individuals to monitor their banks is removed. Kareken
and Wallace (1978) argues that deposit insurance has negative effect on the banking
industry. Their model is based on the idea that sub-optimally priced deposit insur-
ance causes distortions in the banks' portfolio which cause instability in the banking
industry. Due to deposit insurance, banks become risky and grow bigger and bigger
until some of them probably fail and then the taxpayers must compensate for the
loss. This approach tells us that deposit insurance might create financial crisis.
The same moral hazard problem applies to the insurance of national deposit
insurance schemes. In this case, not only banks' but also member states behaviour
will change in an undesirable way. Member states are incentivized to apply riskier
measures to boost their banking sector to increase their tax revenue and and gain
from increased employment and credit expansion since other member states will
compensate for the bank failures. Thus, policies to limit the consequences of the
moral hazard of a common deposit insurance should be considered on national level
too. Nevertheless, tax competition among member states can limit their direct
profit through taxes from the expanded banking sector. The member states are less
incentivized if the costs related to the bank failure are collected on supranational
level.
Freixas and Rochet (2008) introduce a simple model to illustrate the moral
hazard issue. It is a static model with only two dates. At T = 0 the premium after
deposit insurance is paid by the bank. At T = 1 the bank is liquidated, and its
depositors are compensated from the deposit insurance fund whenever the bank's
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assets are insufficient.
At T = 1 the stockholders receive the liquidation value of the bank.
V˜ = L˜−D + S˜,
where L˜ is loan repayments, D is deposits and S˜ is the payment from deposit
insurance S˜ = max(0, D − L˜).
The D can be written as L+P −E, where L is loans, P is insurance premium
and E is equity, so V˜ can be expressed as
V˜ = E + (L˜− L) + (max(0, D − L˜)− P )
This means that the shareholders' value of the bank equals the sum of its initial
value, the increase or decrease in the value of loans, and the net subsidy from the
deposit insurance.
Assume now that L˜ can take two values: X with probability θ and 0 with
probability (1− θ). Thus the expected value of the bank's shares is
Π
def
= E(V˜ )− E = (θ ·X − L) + ((1− θ) ·D − P ) (1)
From the above equation the first term shows the net present value of the
loan, while the second is the net subsidy from the deposit insurance scheme. The
moral hazad problem can be easily seen from the (1) in the case of flat-rate deposit
insurance. A flat-rate deposit insurance is when the premium P after the insurance
depends only on the volume of the deposits at the bank and not on the level of the
risk of the bank's assets (Allen & Gale, 2007). Moreover the banks can determine
the values of (θ,X) in a given feasible set since they can decide in which project to
invest. This results in banks choosing investments with highest risk or the lowest
probability of θ.
In the following, I will present a slightly modified format of Freixas and
Rochet (2008) to show the moral hazard of insurance of national deposit insurance
schemes. It is also a static model with two dates. At T = 0 the banks decide
between risky and safe investments. At T = 1 the banks are either liquidated or on
the contrary to Freixas and Rochet (2008) they have to pay the deposit insurance
premium. In case of liquidation, the depositors are compensated from the deposit
insurance fund whenever the bank's assets are insufficient.
I add taxes t to the model. These taxes represent a given percentage and are
paid by the banks to the national governments after the value of their assets A. So
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as A increases, the government revenue At also increases. The banks have to pay
the taxes t at T = 1.
For simplicity, I assume that banks have only loans L as assets thus A(−P )−
At = L(−P )−Lt at T = 1 after the taxes and the ex-post deposit insurance premium
P are paid, whenever it is needed. On the liability side, banks have deposits D and
equity E thus the whole balance sheet equation is A(−P ) − At = L(−P ) − Lt =
D + E(−P ) − Dt. Moreover, I also assume that after liquidation of a bank, the
depositors, who get their money either from the bank or the deposit insurance fund,
will again deposit their money in another bank in the same country.
Assume now that the whole banking sector can choose between two kind of
projects at T = 0 and all of the banks will have at least one projects. Risky projects
with L either increases byX with probability θ and takes 0 with probability (1−θ) or
safe projects L either increases by x with probability γ and takes 0 with probability
(1− γ), where X > x > 0 and γ > θ.
In case of a bank failure, when L takes the value 0 and the bank is not able
to pay out its depositors, the deposit insurance fund needs to step in and pays out
the depositors. The P ex-post deposit insurance premium for the other banks will
then be D
n−1
, where n is the number of the banks at national level. For simplicity, I
assume that all the banks will pay the same amount of deposit insurance premium
regardless their size. They will not pay after the amount of covered deposits.
Now when there is a common deposit insurance, the number of the banks are
N , where N>n, than P is D
N−1
thus smaller than in the previous case.
In the above modified settings, the banks' incentives do not change compared
to Freixas and Rochet (2008). They will still choose investments with highest risk.
In the following, I will analyse the governments' incentives in case of a com-
mon insurance. In my analysis, I will consider the whole banking sector, and I
assume first that all the banks outside the member state will choose to invest in
extra safe assets with zero chance of failure.
In case when banks chose risky projects, the exact cost of failures for the
banking system in the given member state at T = 1 is {Pθn+ [E(1− θ)n]}, where
P = (1−θ)Dn
[N−(1−θ)n]
. The first part, Pθn, is the deposit insurance premium paid by all
the successful banks in the member state after all the failed banks, while the second
part, E(1− θ)n, is the sum of the lost equities after the failures. The P has simply
changed according to the number of failures.
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Thus the total change in the banking sector's value in the member state is
(X · A · n · θ)− {Pθn+ [(1− θ)E]}, (2)
where (X · A · n · θ) is the value increase from all the banks with successful risky
projects and the second part is the above described cost of failures. Note that taxes
haven't been paid yet.
Similarly, in the case when banks chose safer projects, the total change in the
banking sector's value in the member state is
(x · A · n · γ)− {Pγn+ [(1− γ)E]}, (3)
The government's motive is to increase its tax revenue. Whenever (2) is pos-
itive and n compared to N is small enough, the government revenue will be higher
as banks choose riskier projects. Thus, the government will be motivated to en-
courage their banking sector to take more risk since the direct (bank taxes) and
indirect gains (jobs and credits) will remain in the country while the cost of failures
are socialized. Although, the direct gains are limited when there is significant tax
competition. The governments can incentivize the domestic banks through different
national legalisation, policies or government ownership to take higher risks. Fur-
thermore, it can be seen that as the number of the banks in the nation is smaller
compared to the number of banks in the common fund, the sovereigns' interest to
encourage banks to take higher risk is increased since losses are more socialized.
A further way to analyse the relationship between risk-sharing and moral
hazard is presented by Persson and Tabellini (1996). They explicitly focus on this
trade-off in a fiscal union setting. In their model, an insurance, such as deposit
insurance, provided by a fiscal union, shares the international risk, and therefore
reduces the incentives of member states to pursue structural reforms or might even
incentivizes them to enact policies that increases local risk.
In their model, consider two member states populated by a continuum of
risk-averse individuals, who share the same basic concave preference function for
consumption. The income of the individual i is 1 with probability pi and zero with
probability (1 − pi). The income is not verifiable. The fraction of individuals with
income is denoted by p which can take two values: γ with probability θ and β with
probability (1− θ), where β < γ. The value of p is depends on the aggregate risk.
This risk can be modified by a policy which is chosen by majority rule before
the p is observed. The p has two components. First, there is a government run
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social insurance policy (unemployment insurance or in a slightly changed setting
deposit insurance if the individuals deposit their income in banks) contingent on
the aggregate state p, which redistributes between individuals with and without
income, c(p) and b(p). Second, g represents the amount of resources reserved for
public investment (structural reforms which improve the economy's adjustment to
macroeconomic shocks), which increase the probability of γ (good aggregate state).
Therefore, the probability θ is an increasing and concave function of g.
Combining the social insurance and public investment, the per capita resource
constraint in state p is:
p = pc(p) + (1− p)p(b) + g
Thus, the feasible policy in political equilibrium is a nonnegative vector of
[p(c), p(b), g] chosed by individuals based on their expected utility.
For the two ex-ante identical countries, there are four possible states of ag-
gregate output Y (p, p∗), where ∗ represents the foreign-country variables.
Y (γ, γ) = 2γ with probability θ(g)θ(g∗)
Y (γ, β) = γ + β with probability θ(g)(1− θ(g∗))
Y (β, γ) = β + γ with probability (1− θ(g))θ(g∗)
Y (β, β) = 2β with probability (1− θ(g))(1− θ(g∗))
From the above options, the member state could share the output risks in
the second and third situations by intergovernment transfers denoted by τ (Persson
& Tabellini, 1996). The amount of the transfers equals τ fraction of the excess
national output over the average output in the two countries, τ(p − p∗)/2. The
first best, to cooperatively decide on policies, cannot be achieved because of the
imperfect verifiability of national policies. The authors analyse a noncooperative
constitutional arrangements as possible second-best option. In this arrangement,
the member states do not internalize the effect of national policies g on the other
country. The individuals choose the national policies (to determine p(c), p(d), and g)
and confederative policy (to determine the intergovernmental transfers τ) simultane-
ously. In this setting, the risk sharing can exacerbate the moral hazard as countries
have less incentives to invest in national policies g to increase their capacity to adjust
shocks (Persson & Tabellini, 1996).
The above models show that common deposit insurance can alter govern-
ments behaviour. Unfortunately, because of incomplete information problem, the
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common insurer cannot write a perfect contract in which she specifies all the actions
the governments need to undertake.
Persson and Tabellini (1996) recommend centralization to counteract the
moral hazard in their model. This centralization can be either a different constitu-
tional arrangement with modified voting timing and commitment to risk-sharing or
an endogenous delegation to a federal policymaker in charge of insurance.
In general, Shavell (1979) discusses two different methods to ensure prudent
behaviour. First, incomplete insurance coverage exposes governments to greater risk,
therefore can ensure proper incentives. Second, the monitoring and supervision by
the insurer can also induce more liable actions from governments to prevent losses.
However, these solutions can only partially eliminate the problem. The incomplete
coverage by its own attribution, that it incompletely covers, cannot be the perfect
method. In addition, the common insurer hardly can have ex-ante accurate obser-
vations. Thus even in case of supervision and incomplete common coverage, the
governments would have incentives to encourage banks to take higher risks (Shavell,
1979).
Merton (1977) discusses risk-based deposit insurance as a solution for bank's
moral hazard. Risk-based deposit insurance means that the premium P is adjusted
to the riskiness of bank's assets and not only depends on the volume of deposits.
Merton views deposit insurance payment as a put option on bank's assets and he
argues that this arbitrage pricing method can be used for an adequate pricing policy.
His result is that the rate of P/D of the deposit insurance is an increasing function
of the deposit-to-asset ratio and of the volatility of the bank's assets. However,
this method needs the assumption of complete markets. Freixas and Rochet (2008)
assert that it is more reasonable to assume incomplete financial markets thus they
suggest another pricing method. The NPV of the contract can be computed based
on a risk-adjusted measures.
Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) talk about two issues how fairly a
deposit insurance can be priced. First is timing. Even in the case when the port-
folio decisions of a bank are observable, there is a time lag between these portfolio
decisions and the determination of the deposit insurance premium which makes it
hard for the policy maker to price fairly. Second issue is adverse selection because of
asymmetric information. The above two issues result that even if fairly priced de-
posit insurance is possible it may wouldn't be optimal since it would be inconsistent
with incentive compatibility.
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Furthermore, I describe two macro-prudential policies which theoretically
could limit the consequences of moral hazard generated by deposit insurance. The
first is deposit rate regulation which was used in the U.S. and is also discussed in the
article of Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000). This method could counterbalance
the excessive risk-taking of the banks by providing high charter value and limiting
the interest rate of loans. As a result, banks invest in less risky projects thus this
method would increase the stability of the banking system. Nevertheless, deposit
rate regulation can jeopardize the competition in the banking sector by the ceilings
on the rates.
Second, capital requirements can also provide a solution to the excessive risk-
taking generated by deposit insurance. By its pure existence, it reduces the risks:
the shareholders have more incentives to encourage banks to choose less risky project
to avoid large losses in case of failure and as the capital buffer is higher, the chance
of default is smaller (Freixas & Rochet, 2008). The main disadvantage of the capital
requirements is that equity increases the cost of lending and causes a decline in
economic investment and growth. However, Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that
based on Modigliani-Miller theorem capital requirements shouldn't affect the total
cost of lending. They claim that equity only seems to be more expensive for the
banks because public insurance enables them to borrow at low costs.
In the chapter above I discussed the liquidity and monitoring services pro-
vided by the banks as a reason for their existence. I also summarized the incom-
patible side of financial intermediaries and the consequences of it, and how can a
deposit insurance provide a solution for them. Furthermore, I explored the negative
sides of the deposit insurance and the ways of mitigations. I also analysed the moral
hazard in case of insurance of national deposit insurance schemes.
2.5 Insurance pools and risk-sharing
Insurance pools are used by private financial institutions to insure extraordinary
large risks which could not be insured by a stand-alone company. Insurance pools are
basically an agreement between insurers to jointly assume risks based on percentages,
however these agreements exist in many heterogenous form and can have many
distinct features (E&Y, 2014). The potential advantages are to reduce counterparty
risks by facing more insurer and to be able to insure particularly large risks that
occur infrequently such as nuclear or environmental catastrophes (Inderst, 2016).
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In the latter case, this type of insurance agreement may the only viable alternative.
This form of risk sharing produce efficiencies such as risk diversification, knowledge
sharing, and lower insurance costs and premiums (Inderst, 2016). Nevertheless, by
knowledge sharing and cooperation, the competitiveness of the insurance market
can by harmed which might on the contrary cause increased insurance premiums
(E&Y, 2014).
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3 Empirical research review
In the following part, I review the empirical literature of the deposit insurance. Nu-
merous scholars have tried to investigate the effect of deposit insurance on financial
system stability, development and market discipline. The question is whether the
moral hazard or the preventive effect from the bank runs dominates. When deposit
insurance is introduced, market discipline tends to shrink since depositors in case of
failure are covered by national funds. However, the other element of the trade-off is
that in times of crisis deposit insurance can maintain trust in the banking sector and
prevent bank runs. The difficulty to answer the question is that the features of the
deposit insurance schemes and institutional environment greatly vary from country
to country. Other challenges are the problem of reverse causality and endogeneity
that there are factors that jointly influence the characteristics of deposit insurance,
the probability of bank runs and financial development.
In the studies, one of the marked conclusions is that the quality of the insti-
tutional environment (banking regulation and legal environment) is really important
factor to limit the negative consequences of the moral hazard. Even the same deposit
insurance features might have different effects in different institutional environment.
Further broad conclusion is that explicit deposit insurance schemes (clearly
defined in the legal environment and ex-ante funded) are more effective than implicit
schemes.
Moreover, most of the studies showed that deposit insurance can induce se-
rious moral hazard problems and greatly decrease the market discipline. In some
cases, the authors even concluded that the negative effects dominate over the posi-
tive ones.
Below, I will shortly describe several studies in two parts. First, I collected
those major studies which examine the effect on banking system stability. In the
second part, the studies focus on the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline.
3.1 Effect on banking system stability
One of the main reasons to install a deposit insurance scheme is that it is believed
that the stability of the banking system will increase since bank runs are less likely
to happen in the presence of deposit insurance.
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Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (2002) have studied the impact
of deposit insurance in times of banking crises. Their study covers evidence for 61
countries in 1980-97 and uses a multivariate logit model with many explanatory and
control variables to find out whether deposit insurance increases or decreases the
probability of banking crises. The authors found that variations in the features of
the deposit insurance schemes such as more extensive coverage, ex-ante funding or
government management increases the adverse moral hazard impact of the schemes.
Outside factors such as deregulated bank interest rates and weak institutional envi-
ronment increases the likelihood of banking crisis.
The increased risk-taking by banks in economic booms due to deposit insur-
ance was confirmed by Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache (2002). Deniz
Anginer, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Min Zhu (2014) made a similar follow-up study to
analyse the effects during the recent financial crisis and the years preceding it (2004-
2012) on banks' risk-taking. The authors find that banking system is more stable
when deposit insurance scheme is installed. During a financial crisis, the stabilizing
effect of the deposit insurance dominates. The authors argue that supervision and
prudential regulation are important factors to limit the negative effects of deposit
insurance schemes.
In the study, the authors used a comprehensive cross-country database, in-
cluding a variety of deposit insurance features, compiled by Demirgüç-Kunt, Kara-
caovali, and Laeven (2005) and was updated in 2013.
3.2 Effect on financial development
Robert Cull, Lemma Senbet and Marco Sorge (2004) not only tested the relationship
between deposit insurance and banking system stability but also on growth of bank
intermediation. Their study focuses on the long-run impacts of the features of the
deposit insurance on bank intermediation. They find that generous deposit insurance
has negative impact both on the stability of banking system and the long-run growth
in countries lacking suitable supervision and rules of law.
3.3 Effect on market discipline
When deposit insurance is installed, the market discipline tends to decrease as de-
positors do not longer monitor banks and bear the losses in case of failure. The lack
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of market discipline leads also to excessive risk taking.
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Harry Huizinga (2004) investigated the relationship
between market discipline and deposit insurance. Using cross-country dataset, the
authors find that deposit insurance reduces required interest rates by depositors
since banks do not have to compensate fully for their risk-taking.
Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala (2000)'s study focuses on the EU banking
sector. They evaluate the level of moral hazard created by deposit insurance. The
authors argue that implicit deposit insurance creates higher potential for moral
hazard than explicit scheme. The reason is that even though implicit insurance
carries uncertainty, the implicit schemes may cover not only depositors but larger
set of bank stakeholders whose monitoring effort could reduce increased risk-taking.
Relating to this study, Reint Gropp and Jukka Vesala (2004) confirm that a credible
bail-in regulation can reduce the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance.
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4 Deposit insurance in general
The first deposit insurance scheme was introduced in the United States. During the
Great Depression, The GlassSteagall Act of 1933 installed the federal deposit insur-
ance (FDIC), in addition to the separation of commercial and investment banking
operations, after many state level deposit insurance schemes went bankrupt. The
reasons of the bankruptcies were the inadequate size and lack of risk-sharing among
insurers. Similarly to the eurozone, the US had a central bank for twenty years
before the installation of the FDIC. Since 1933, the FDIC has resolved thousands of
banks. Just in 2009, at the peak of the Great Recession, it had to intervene in about
150 banks. The resolutions are mostly financed by the provision fees and its interest
on assets, however the FDIC can borrow up to $ 500 billion from the Treasury if the
Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the White House approved it. (Aizenman, 2012)
After the Savings and Loan crisis and the banking crisis in Sweden in the 1980s and
1990s, the International Monetary Fund has started to recommend deposit insurance
as a necessary instrument for financial safety (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). Figure
2 shows the rapid development of the number of explicit deposit insurance schemes
worldwide from 1933. In 2013, 112 countries had explicit deposit insurance.
Deposit insurances can have many different features and forms: explicit-
implicit, private-public, compulsory-voluntary, ex-ante funded, with co-insurance,
flat-rate or risk-based assessment fees, etc. (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) One of
the most significant difference from these is whether the insurance is explicit or
implicit. Explicit insurance means that laws describe in a detailed way how a deposit
insurance works. The coverage limit, the payout delay and the frame of funding
are all clarified. On the other hand, implicit deposit insurance is when the laws
concerning the deposit insurance do not exist and the government's protection of the
depositors is discretionary (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). The main advantage of an
explicit scheme is the increased financial safety during a crisis. However, the scheme
creates moral hazard with potential devastating consequences on the long term. In
addition to the moral hazard, an implicit scheme also cause uncertainty due to the
lack of exact legal background. Furthermore, most of the deposit insurance schemes
are public, though there are some counterexamples. In Germany and Austria, in
addition to the public insurance, there is a voluntary private deposit insurance,
so-called Institutional Protection Schemes, which goes beyond the public coverage
limit (European Commission, 2010). Another difference is whether a scheme is
voluntary or compulsory. In Europe all the public schemes are compulsory in order to
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avoid adverse selection of problematic banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). Deposit
insurances can apply flat-rate or risk-based provision fees. The risk-based fees are
more optimal since they limit the moral hazard (Merton, 1977).
When banks fail and are not capable to repay the entitled depositors' claim,
the deposit insurance scheme pays out the depositors. An explicit scheme pays out
until an ex-ante determined threshold in a short period with available funds and if
necessary, with immediate ex-post contributions. In this case, the deposit insurance
scheme is a liquidity provider. (Freixas & Rochet, 2008) In the subsequent bank
resolution, the authorities try to recover the amount of covered deposits. If the
required amount cannot be fully recouped from the insolvency proceedings, the
deposit insurance fund needs to absorb the losses and raise long-term contribution
from the banking sector (Freixas & Rochet, 2008).
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5 Deposit insurance in the EU
In the following part, I discuss the current regulation of the deposit insurance
schemes in the EU, and how these schemes managed to tackle the recent crisis.
I also analyse why the loop between sovereigns and banks proved to be so vicious.
Furthermore, I introduce European Union's answer to the problem, to how to break
this vicious circle, the banking union.
5.1 Current regulation
The EU started to harmonize its member states' deposit insurance scheme first in
the Directive 94/19/EC. It ensured only minimal harmonization. Different funding
schemes were still allowed but at least all the member states had their own scheme.
After the global financial crisis broke out, a new Directive 09/14/EC entered into
force. It increased stepwise the protection limit to ¿100,000 from ¿20,000 per indi-
vidual per bank in every country. The legislation introduced the so called temporary
high balance case related to specific life events such as marriage, divorce, retirement
or real estate transactions. It also reduced the pay-out delay from three months
to 20 days and dropped the 10% co-insurance part which had prevailed in many
European countries. In the scheme, the pay-out is totally automatic, the depositors
don't have to apply for it. As the crisis worsened, the EU decided to establish the
banking union and it also enforced further harmonization of the national deposit
insurance schemes (European Parliament, 2014a). The targeted financial endow-
ment is 0.8% of the total covered deposits. This fund should be ex-ante established
by 2024 (Art. 10 para. 2, Directive 2014/49/EU) and can include cash, deposits,
payment commitments and low-risk assets which can be liquidated within a short
period of time. The contribution to the deposit insurance scheme is now not only
based on the amount of covered deposits but also on the risk profile of the banks.
The risk-adjusted calculation formula is defined by the European Banking Author-
ity. The Directive 2014/49/EU also made it possible for national deposit insurance
funds to lend between each other, however so far no voluntary lending has been
agreed (European Commission, 2016). Furthermore, it reduced the pay-out to 7
days and required to disclose clear information about the deposit protection system.
Depositors at bank branches in another member states are paid-out by the deposit
insurance fund in the host member state (European Parliament, 2014a). Currently
not only the banks in their host member state are required to join to the deposit
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insurance scheme but also third country branches are covered. According to the
empirical studies, the above modifications increased the effectiveness of the deposit
insurance schemes in case of crises however also induced more serious moral hazard.
In 2015, the Commission (EC) proposed an European Deposit Insurance
Scheme (European Commission, 2015). In this proposal, a full common deposit
insurance scheme would be stepwise installed by 2024. First, a re-insurance phase,
then co-insurance and full-insurance with a funding equal to 0.8% of the total covered
deposits (around ¿43 billion in the eurozone) as Figure 3 shows. This proposal was
not yet approved by the Council of EU and the European Parliament. Later, I will
introduce this recommendation of the EC in greater detail.
5.2 Eurozone in the crisis
In the following part, I examine how the national systems of deposit insurance
worked during the eurozone (EZ) crisis. First, I briefly describe the functioning of
the euro area at the time of the crisis. Second, I analyse the reasons and effects of
the crisis on the financial sector.
The eurozone is a monetary union without any deeper fiscal integration. The
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was established to support growth, high
employment and further integration of the member states (European Commission,
2007). It was launched in 1992 and gradually implemented in the decade. It involves
a common currency, a common monetary policy, and minimal coordination of fiscal
policies by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP's aim is to prevent
the emergence of excessive public deficit and debt. Nevertheless, as the last crisis
showed, it doesn't fulfil its object to ensure debt sustainability. When the crisis hit
the EU, many of the member states had large amount of public debt in addition to
having heavily indebted private sector. Moreover, not this was the only problematic
point in the institution of the monetary union that facilitated fragilities. At the
time of the crisis, there was no common supervision and resolution, and without
these a credible no-bail out clause is unimaginable (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). If
insolvent member states don't get credit, then their banking sector would become
insolvent too which would cause serious harms in the whole European banking sector
because of the significant cross-border activities. As shown by Allen and Gale (2000),
failure of banks can easily affect other healthy banks too. The incompleteness of
the monetary union resulted that (1) there was a vicious circle between the banks
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and sovereigns and (2) due to the common currency devaluation was not an option.
These characteristics made the crisis much more severe.
As identified by Baldwin and Giavazzi (2015), the main reasons of the eu-
rozone crisis were the economic imbalances between core and periphery states, and
the lack of policy reforms. There were substantial capital flows (current account
surpluses) from the core nations like Germany, France and the Netherlands to pe-
riphery countries like Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (current account
deficits). This large amount of capital then financed private and government spend-
ing which increased not only the wages (and decreased the competitiveness) but also
the government and private debts. Moreover, the fact that this capital went into
non-traded sectors (such as real estate) meant that it will be hard to repay it in the
future.
There are several reasons behind these capital inflows. There are abundant
investment possibilities in the least developed EU countries compared to the core
nations. Furthermore, cheap credit is available. Globally, even before the financial
crisis, the borrowing costs plummeted consistently (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
There are several hypothesis for the fall in the borrowing costs, however it is disputed
between economists that which explanation until which degree is responsible for the
phenomenon (Fidora & Bracke, 2008). According to Nicolas Véron (2013), with
the creation of the EMU, Europe's capital market became more integrated and this
raised the expectation of a future consolidation wave. The banks, to be able to
remain on the top, started to increase their size by leveraging and acquiring their
rivals. Véron highlights that the acquisition and leveraging was viewed positively by
authorities as the local national champions will be able to compete more effectively
on the integrated market. Moreover, thanks to the common currency, there was zero
currency risk in the euro area. At the time of the crisis, the trust in the euro area was
high as shown by the trend that all of the EZ nations borrowing rates plummeted and
converged to each other (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). Unfortunately, until the crisis,
these capital flows were viewed as a real economic convergence between member
states and not as dangerous imbalances.
The crisis started with a sudden stop of capital flows after it, originated out-
side from the EU, reached the euro area. The stop of flows raised concerns about
the solvency of banks and sovereign debts in the periphery. It was especially cum-
bersome when in October 2009 the Greek government announced that the previous
governments had hidden the real figures of government debt and the true size of the
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budget deficit is twice as large as previously thought (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). In
addition, during the pre-crisis years, not Greece was the only country which violated
the pact. Between 1999 and 2007, there were 34 breaches of the 3% threshold for
the government deficit even by Germany and France, which set especially damag-
ing precedents. The SGP sanctioning mechanisms were barely employed before the
crisis (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
In the crisis, the governments' tax base decreased and they had to assume pri-
vate debts (mostly as they saved their too big to fail banks) which further increased
the public debt. This created a public debt crisis, and the governments' borrowing
cost rose rapidly. The rise of capital inflows was not unique to the eurozone. Same
happened in the U.S., Japan and many emerging countries too (Baldwin & Giavazzi,
2015). Borrowing cost decreased significantly even before the crisis broke out. The
characteristics which made the crisis worse are the specific amplifiers in the system
of eurozone such as the vicious circle between banks and sovereign, no lender of last
resort (LOLR) for governments and the predominance of bank financing.
First, there was no real lender of last resort for governments. This meant
that self-fulfilling panics could cause sovereigns to become insolvent. The European
Central Bank (ECB) was later equipped with the Outright Monetary Transaction
(OMT) instrument which partially act as a lender of last resort (Wyplosz, 2012).
Moreover, Europe's special trait is the predominance of bank financing of the econ-
omy. At the time of the crisis banks were under capitalised and had several times
larger balance sheet than their home country's GDP (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
The case of Ireland is especially informative since it went into the crisis with
low level of government debt (43% debt-GDP ratio in 2008), however with out-
standing size of banking sector (783% bank assets-GDP ratio in 2008 (Baldwin &
Giavazzi, 2015)). As the capital flows stopped, the asset prices plummeted, banks'
capital eroded, they got into trouble, and the government almost become insolvent
as it saved its banks. The Irish government was bailed out in the end of 2010 by
the IMF, eurozone governments and ECB (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
The Irish example clearly shows that the national instruments (supervision,
resolution and deposit insurance scheme) were not capable to cope with the bank-
ing crisis. The bad equilibria described by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) cannot be
avoided. The banking sector was too big in many countries thus its sovereign hardly
could save it without to become also insolvent. There was no euro area level struc-
ture (such as the banking union today) which could handle a large financial crisis.
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Subsequently, as the Belgian government at end of 2011 saved its national bank,
Dexia, the bond holders started to demand higher interest rates in their fear that
the Belgian government will also need to be bailed out (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
Cyprus is also needed to be bailed out due to its banking sector's large exposure to
Greek government bonds in 2013. The Cypriot government even decided to impose
capital controls to foster financial stability. These measures were eventually lifted
after two years (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015). The exact effects of them are hard
to assess since they were implemented simultaneously with other instruments. In
any case, the controls were quite controversial in the European Union since the free
movement of capital is one of the fundamental principle of it. Within the euro area,
if the ability to transfer money is restricted, then the value of euro in that particular
country will becomes inferior to the value of euro in other countries (Wolff, 2013).
Nevertheless, the use of capital controls is quite rare since they may may send the
adverse signal that the first-best policies, such as deposit insurance, are not reliable
to stop the bank runs (Ostry et al., 2012). Historically, capital controls were usually
implemented as long-term measures to manipulate trade. However, they were re-
assessed recently as macro-prudential instruments by several scholars. For example,
Ostry et al. (2012) argues for the flexible use of capital controls to maintain financial
stability in crisis.
The clear message of the euro area crisis was that the national instruments
were not able to manage their problematic large banks, and that EZ needs supra-
national level instruments.
5.3 Sovereign-bank loop
There was and in some degree still there is a significant vicious circle between the
sovereigns in the euro area and the banking industry of these countries. This vi-
cious circle has contributed a lot to the severity of the recent crisis. The relationship
between them is the following: banks hold large amounts of government bonds com-
pared to the size of their balance sheet (e.g. in case of Italy, the banks' average
exposure to home sovereign was 10% of total bank assets 2015) (Magnus & Ciucci,
2016). Thus, when the sovereigns are likely to fail and the value of the government
bonds are decreasing, it will also deteriorate the banks' balance sheet, which will
increase the likelihood that the banks will fail. Furthermore, the banks exposed to
the domestic economy and also benefit from the government guarantees. On the
other hand, the sizes of the banks are several times larger than the size of their
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home countries' GDP (e.g. in case of Italy the total bank assets as a percentage of
GDP was 220% in 2007 (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015)), so when the banks are going
to bankruptcy, the sovereigns will also get in to trouble due to related costs of the
resolution. The states' financial costs from a banking crisis result from recapitali-
sation, liability guarantees, decreased tax revenues and additional expenditures to
mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis (Pisani-Ferry & Wolff, 2012). The sovereign
and bank CDS spreads strongly correlates in the euro area which may also refer
to this vicious circle (see Figure 1). As shown by De Grauwe and Ji (2012), bond
markets in a monetary union, such as eurozone, are more susceptible to self-fulfilling
liquidity crises than in countries with own currency. In stand-alone sovereigns, the
national banks can devaluate and easily act as a lender of last resort. On the other
hand, in a monetary union without LOLR, the panic of investors triggers a bad
equilibria.The aim of the banking union is to break the sovereign-bank loop.
Decoupling banks from sovereign would result that the funding costs of the
banks will be more equal across the EU, and the banking market would become
more integrated.
5.4 Banking union
As the financial crisis unfolded into a euro area debt crisis, the leaders of the Eu-
ropean Union decided to establish the banking union to break the sovereign-bank
loop. The banking union is based on the Single Rulebook which is a set of har-
monized rules regulating the financial sector initiated by the European Commission
(EC) and the European Banking Authority (EBA). Geographically, all the euro area
countries are members of the banking union and the non-euro area EU countries are
free to join to it. Originally, the banking union is planned to have three pillars: the
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and
European Deposit Insurance Scheme from which the first two were already adopted.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism means that the European Central Bank is
the main supervisor of the financial institutions in the euro area. Under this mech-
anism, it has extensive powers: grants and withdraws licences, authorises mergers
and acquisitions, and determine prudential requirements (Schoenmaker, 2015).
It directly supervises the most significant banks in the euro area (126 banks
as of December 2016) (European Central Bank, 2016). In this context, significance
is based on number of criteria such as the total assets as percentage of the home
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country's GDP, cross-border activity or size of total assets over¿30 billion. Common
supervision is more optimal for the euro area since it considers the whole zone and
not only the given country where the supervised bank resides. The above conditions
ensure that the so called national champions will be supervised by ECB, and they
won't get special handling from their home country's authority. Deniz Anginer, Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt and Min Zhu (2014) pointed out that supervision is an effective way
to limit the adverse moral hazard effects of deposit insurance.
Despite the strengthened ex-ante supervision, banks may fall. The Single Res-
olution Mechanism is an independent European Union Agency and responsible for
restructuring of the troubled banks in a way that a failure won't harm substantially
the economy or cause any financial instability. The main methods of resolutions
can be a takeover by a healthy bank, a public assistance programme, and a liq-
uidation with pay-outs to depositors by the deposit insurance fund (Schoenmaker,
2015). One of the main aims of the SRM is to reduce to burden on the taxpayers
regarding to resolution. To ensure this, the resolution mechanism has its own fund,
the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which equals to 1% of the covered deposits, and
apply bail-in during the resolutions (European Parliament, 2014c).
Before using any resources from the SRF, the SRM checks whether there is
any private sector solution or the bail-in will be sufficient to resolve the case. Bail-in
means that the shareholders and bond holders of the failing bank will be bailed-in
up to 8% of the total liabilities. The bail-in rules are set in the Banking Recovery
and Resolution Directive (BRRD) (European Parliament, 2014b). This directive
creates a more certain legal framework for resolution.
The Single Resolution Fund is only accessible after the bond and shareholders
are bailed-in. This fund is ex-ante financed by the banking sector on risk-based
contribution. The target level of the fund is at least 1% of covered deposits of banks
in the banking union (estimated to be ¿50 - ¿55 billion) which will be reached until
2024 (European Parliament, 2014c). To establish a credible resolution mechanism,
the EU needs a financial back-stop. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
could provide this safety by giving credit to the SRF. (European Parliament, 2014c)
The ESM has a fund up to ¿500 billion. The presence of this back-stop is important
in case of a systematic crisis since the size of the SRF won't be sufficient to resolve
all the troubled banks.
The SRM effectively reduces the burden on the sovereigns since it is respon-
sible for the resolution of the failing banks thus it lessens the link between banks
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and sovereigns.
The third pillar of the banking union is the common European deposit insur-
ance scheme however this wasn't implemented yet, and only a commission proposal
exists (European Commission, 2015). I will discuss this proposal later. In the
current system, still the national deposit insurance funds are responsible for the
protection and pay-out of the depositors.
A separate tool to break the loop is ESM's direct recapitalization instrument
(European Council, 2013). It is a financial assistance tool with which ESM can
recapitalise euro area banks directly, by purchasing equity in the bank. Nevertheless,
the necessary conditions to allow ESM to purchase equity stake is rigorous. ESM
can use its fund only when the bail-in of private investors and the contribution of the
Single Resolution Fund are not sufficient, and the state is unable to provide financial
assistance (European Council, 2013). Due to these strict conditions, the direct
recapitalization instrument hardly weakens the link between banks and sovereigns.
Before this instrument was in place, Spain's government directly borrowed from the
ESM in 2012 to recapitalize its banks which together with further costs of the crisis
management in turn increased its government debt from a low level (36 percent of
GDP in 2007) to well above the Maastricht limit (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015).
Dirk Schoenmaker (2015) highlights that the long term objective of the bank-
ing union is to deal with cross-border banking to avoid coordination failure resulting
from the national authorities' home bias. Without handling it, contagion can occur
more easily and have serious consequences on banking system stability (Allen &
Gale, 2000). Table 2 shows that top 25 banks in the euro area have 24 percent of
their assets in other EU countries (Schoenmaker, 2015). Now, in the framework of
banking union, larger shares of the balance sheets of the banks are considered during
the supervision and resolution decisions. In the European single market, capital is
one of the four freedoms. In reality, the free movement of capital is started in 1992
with the Maastricht Treaty. (Baldwin & Giavazzi, 2015) This treaty contained the
necessary legalisation to abolish the capital controls.
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6 Objectives of a common deposit insurance
The motive of the banking union is to effectively break the sovereign-bank loop.
The first two pillars, the Single Rulebook, and the BRRD are already implemented
thus the question is whether to what extent the common deposit insurance is still
necessary to fulfil the objective of the banking union.
The first argument for a common deposit insurance is the lack of credibility
of the national deposit insurance schemes in several, mostly smaller countries due
the small size of their funds and not large enough fiscal back-stops relative to the
size of their banking sector. Free mobility of capital has raised the possibility of
the emergence of large banks and banking sector even in small countries. Without
credibility, deposit insurance cannot prevent bank runs since the early agents will
withdraw and cause bank panics (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Furthermore, any
divergences between national deposit insurance schemes can enhance the financial
sector's fragmentation across member states. In Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and
Portugal the amount of covered deposits by the deposit insurance fund is well above
50% of the countries' GDP (see Figure 4) (Cannas et al., 2015). This large amount
of covered deposits undermines the credibility of the national deposits insurances
in case of huge idiosyncratic shocks. Per the Directive 2014/49/EU, the required
ex-ante size of the national deposits insurance funds is 0.8% of the covered deposits
in the member states. A fund like this hardly can protect even against large bank's
bankruptcy. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the credibility also depends on the
health of the financial and of the public sector. Unfortunately, after the bankruptcy
of a bank, the other banks in the country must replenish the deposit insurance fund
thereby further deteriorating their profitability. A European deposit insurance fund
with a financial back-stop (such as ESM) could provide a credible crisis management
solution in case of large shocks since insurances works better as the number of
the banks and states involved are larger. A more credible scheme would be in
the interest of all the depositors (increased safety of deposits), banks (more stable
safety net, cheaper credit), member states (increased protection of public finances
and persistence in crisis) and the European Union (increased persistence in crisis).
Another main advantage of a common deposit insurance scheme would be
to establish a consistent and incentive compatible deposit insurance mechanism
(Schoenmaker, 2015). Currently the deposit insurance schemes are on national
while supervision is on European level thus supervision decisions (and lack of de-
cisions) would make national taxpayers pay even though their government might
38
oppose a decision or blame the supervision for inaction. For example a bank failure
and its consequnces are worn by a national insurnace fund because the European
supervision authority decided not to act in time. This may result in ineffective
governance and cause conflicts which would be hard to resolve since there is no
mechanism to settle disputes between agencies not operating on the same level.
Consistency would ensure that there is no coordination failure and that the super-
visor (SSM) is confronted with the costs of its action (Schoenmaker, 2015). This
incentive compatibility follows from the principal-agent theory (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). Moreover, supranational management ensures more efficient operation and
governance and swifter decision making to better cope with crises. A supranational
common insurance would also take into account cross-border externalities of bank
crises by avoiding co-ordination failures. Consistency and more efficient governance
would be in favor of all the affected agents. However, member states might resist
further EU integration because of their fear of the additional reduction of their
national mandate.
At last, risk-sharing is needed to break the sovereign-banks loop to ensure
that in asymmetric shocks not only the affected member states have to bear the
costs. The risk-sharing would also grant further credibility to a common scheme.
In addition, if risks are shared, significant part of the present fragmentation among
banks within the banking union would disappear. Furthermore, the risk pooling
could help to establish a more credible no bail-out clause of both banks and member
states since if a sovereign become insolvent, the banking sector could still be viable
or if a member state's banking sector struggles, the public finances aren't as much
endangered. However, as Freixas and Rochet (2008) showed, risk-sharing cause
moral hazard. That's why some prerequisites need to be implemented to limit the
negative consequences.
To conclude, the above discussed three objectives justify a common deposit
insurance scheme.
(i) Credibility and adequate size of the deposit insurance fund and fiscal
back-stop
(ii) Consistency between supervision and deposit insurance scheme
(iii) Risk-sharing of the burden in case of failure
In the later parts, I will analyze the policy options according to these three
objectives.
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It is worth noting that the Single Supervision Mechanism and the bail-in
rules only makes it less likely but won't exclude that the depositors will be affected
by a bank failure in the future. A common deposit insurance is needed to increase
the trust in the European banking system.
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7 Prerequisites of a common deposit insurance
As national deposit insurance schemes induce moral hazard, the insurance of na-
tional deposit insurances similarly can have adverse effects. In this case, the com-
mon deposit insurance might change the member states behaviour in an undesirable
way to apply riskier measures. The Single Rulebook, BRRD (especially the bail-in
rules), amendments to capital requirements regulation and directive, SRM, and SSM
have already significantly reduced risk, moral hazard and the monitoring costs of
banks. The risk-based contribution of the banks to the deposit funds (Merton, 1977)
and the EUR 100,000 coverage limit have also significantly restricted the moral haz-
ard. The reduction of moral hazard was mainly achieved by decreasing the banks
incentives to take higher risk and limiting the available measures for the member
states to incentives their banks to take higher risk. Furthermore, the macroeconomic
surveillance of the member states was strengthened by the Treaty of Stability and
Coordination and the Euro Plus Pact (Nieminen et al., 2016). Note that the bail-in
tool induces risk avoidance not only for the banks but also for the member state as
losses in case of a bank failure would affect mainly domestic shareholders.
However, before further risk-sharing, some prerequisites should be imple-
mented to avoid moral hazard in a sufficient extent. Member states may incen-
tivize their banks to assume more risk by adopting different national legalisation
as the costs of failure would be borne by all the banking union countries. Fur-
thermore, the legacy problems related to the recent crisis such as the high share of
non-performing loans should not be covered by a common scheme. The responsibil-
ity for the losses arising from them should remain at the member states, but might
be resolved with the assistance of European authorities. Currently, political willing-
ness for risk-sharing is low. It meets resistance especially from the core European
nations (Schoenmaker & Wolff, 2015). That's why the following problems should be
addressed.
(i) Sovereign exposure of banks. Significant share of the banks' balance
sheet is government bonds where they reside (Magnus & Ciucci, 2016). The
share has largely increased since the start of the crisis. The fundamental rea-
sons behind it might be that the national authorities incentivized banks to
help their governments to finance itself and the ECB's Long-term Refinanc-
ing Operation (LTRO) has provided low interest rate funding to euro area
banks with sovereign debt as a collateral (Véron, 2015). As the CDS of the
sovereigns are different, it follows that also the banks' risk profiles are dif-
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ferent, nevertheless government bonds currently carry zero risk-weight in the
bank's balance sheet. This zero-weight assessment might change in the future
(Véron, 2015). A sovereign exposure rule or a common upper limit on the pro-
portion of government bonds should be introduced to handle this difference
(Wolff, 2016). However, a measure to regulate the government bond holdings
cannot be introduced in a short period since the banks are important lenders
of the governments and local councils. The banks basically act as a shock
absorbers for sovereigns. A rapid reduction of the vast amount of sovereign
debt could induce a public debt crisis. Another option would be the introduc-
tion of Eurobonds to decrease the risks of sovereign bonds (Wolff, 2016). The
decline in the real interest rates indicates a growing need for safe assets. The
availability of such assets has decreased over the last decade mostly by the
reassessment of US residential mortgages and European periphery sovereign
debt (Caballero & Farhi, 2014). The scarcity of these safe assets can cause
sluggish recovery and capital flights in financial stress. They are important
for the smooth functioning of financial markets (Brunnermeier et al., 2016).
Brunnermeier et al. (2016) proposed an euro area-wide safe asset without joint
liability among sovereigns to fulfil this need. In their proposal, senior tranches
of sovereign bonds would be included in the safe assets. A central institution
would purchase these bonds and issue European Safe Bonds and European
Junior Bonds. With adequate subordination level between these bonds, the
safe assets (European Safe Bonds) can be as safe as German sovereign bonds
without the society bearing any further losses compared to the current status
quo (Brunnermeier et al., 2016).
(ii) Healthiness of banks' balance sheet. The European banks have vary-
ing amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) in their balance sheet which hurts
not only their profitability but also means sytematic threats. This is the legacy
of the recent global cirsis. There was no real clean-up of these bad loans after
it. Moreover, the banks are not well-capitalized at the same degree in all the
member states. Some of the member states has more problematic banks than
others which again prevent further risk-sharing. The solution for the NPLs
problem is rather complex since first it should be agreed who should bear the
losses, the banks, borrowers or the public. However, most of the losses should
remain at the member states and not distributed across the European Union.
Several proposal were made such as to create a bad bank or clearing houses at
European level to transfer the problematic loans and to overcome on market
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failures (Demertzis & Wolff, 2016). Nevertheless, banks could be incentivised
also through regulation to resolve the impaired assets more quickly (Véron,
2015).
(iii) Different national macro-prudential policies. The treatment of the
foreign currency loans or the loan-to-value ratios on mortgages are different
across the eurozone countries. (Wolff, 2016) These differences influence the
riskiness of the banks. Through these macro-prudential policies, the national
government can handle their national champions differently. The nations
have the incentives to do so since under the EU's single capital market the
banks compete in an integrated market, and the governments want to defend
and assist them. The different policies not only influence the riskiness of the
banks but also distort the market. Moreover, the governments' ownerships
in the banks should be reviewed since it could create excursive motives in
the management of banks. The empirical literature states that prudential
policies are efficient in limiting the side effects of deposit insurance related
moral hazard (Anginer et al., 2014).
The limitation of the sovereign exposure of banks and the restoration of the
healthiness of banks' balance sheet would deal with the legacy problems while the
unification of the marco-prudential policies would restrict the member states ability
to direct their banking sector to take higher risks.
Furthermore, any policy option with significant national part would also limit
the consequences of moral hazard by decreasing the incentives of member states,
however, would also limit the extent of risk-sharing at the same time. This kind of
approach would be the same as the incomplete coverage discussed by Shavell (1979).
Until at least some of the above measures are implemented, a common de-
posit insurance would largely cover present sovereign problems and can induce moral
hazard thus the introduction of it is unlikely. Domestic political risk brought forth
by crisis can further exaggerate the moral hazard problem. The above discussed
measures would not only facilitate the introduction of a common deposit insurance
but also foster a more integrated banking market by balancing the wide spread in
the funding costs of the banks across Europe (Schoenmaker & Wolff, 2015). Nev-
ertheless, any shift of legitimacy and accountability from national to supranational
level, even if all the measuers are implemented, requires political trust from the side
of member states.
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8 Policy options
In the following part, I list the most relevant policy options. I shortly describe and
analyse them, and later, in the Comparison of policy options part, I compare them
according to the defined three objectives. I consider the following policy options in
the analysis: national deposit insurance schemes (baseline scenario), credit line to
national deposit insurance schemes, re-insurance, co-insurance and full insurance. A
major difference between these policy options is that to what extent they mutualise
risk and cause moral hazard. It is essential to note that there is a trade-off between
risk-sharing and moral hazard. Increased risk-sharing generates higher incentives
for member states to act in an undesirable way. In the baseline scenario, there
is no further risk-sharing, while full insurance would ensure complete risk-sharing.
The differences in the share of the remaining national part in the deposit insurance
scheme is an important factor since it determines the eventual effectiveness in break-
ing the vicious banks-soveregin circle (Schoenmaker & Wolff, 2015). High share of
national part would conserve differences between the countries' banking system.
In the analysis, I will discuss the scenarios according to the three objectives.
(1) Size of the deposit insurance funds and of the fiscal back-stop to have a credible
insurance in case of large systematic shocks. (2) Consistency between supervision
and deposit insurance scheme to avoid the conflicts due to different supranational
and national functions. (3) Risk-sharing of the burden in case of bank failures to
break the vicious sovereign-banks loop.
Nevertheless, without at least partial fulfilment of the prerequisites, further
risk-sharing is unimaginable since they would create adverse incentives for both
banks and member states. (1) The sovereign exposure of banks should be reduced.
(2) The problem of NPLs is quite extensive in the southern region of Europe. (3)
Financial macro-prudential policies should be managed at supranational level. Until
the above issues prevail, the riskiness of the banks will be different across countries
in the European Union.
It is important to note that whichever of the below options will be imple-
mented it should be compulsory for the EZ members to avoid adverse selection
(Gros, 2013). Otherwise only countries with riskier bank profiles would join to the
common deposit insurance scheme.
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8.1 Baseline scenario (no policy change)
The baseline scenario is that the national deposit insurance schemes would remain
in place. Currently, there is only minimal harmonization between the national in-
surance schemes. The regulation requires a fund size of 0.8% of covered deposits
nationally. This option isn't desirable since it wouldn't insure credibly in case of
large systematic failures because the size of funds and the governments as back-stop
wouldn't be adequate. Moreover, a large crisis could evoke a sovereign debt crisis
further aggravating it. Differences in the supranational supervision and national
deposit insurance would still be present.
In large systemic crises, the government can borrow from ESM if it doesn't
have sufficient funds for crisis management. However it would deepen the crisis by
increasing the sovereign debt level. In a hypothetical case, a government would fur-
ther lend the borrowed amount to the national deposit insurance fund or recapitalize
its banking sector.
8.2 Credit line to national deposit insurance schemes
The European Stability Mechanism could be able to lend (after approval of the
representatives) to national deposit insurance funds (Schoenmaker & Wolff, 2015).
The ESM would provide liquidity to national deposit insurance schemes. A direct
link between ESM and the national funds could further strengthen the credibility of
this option, however it requires the ESM treaty change (Véron, 2015). An alternative
option is to build up a mandatory lending scheme between national deposit insurance
funds. These options would reduce to a small extent the sovereign-banks loop by
relieving the burden on the government in case of systematic financial crisis, however
the burden would be significant on the banking sector by increased premiums. It
could also minimally increase the credibility of the deposit insurance by serving as
a stable fiscal back-stop. However, the consistency issues are not solved.
These options (either to link ESM without the ESM treaty change or the
mandatory lending scheme) is currently feasible since it doesn't result in real risk-
sharing, only would mean a lending option to the national deposit insurance funds.
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8.3 Re-insurance
Foremost, the re-insurance, suggested by Gros (2013), would make a substantial dif-
ference compared to the baseline scenario by sharing risks between member states.
In the re-insurance scheme, there would be a common supranational deposit in-
surance fund which is only used when the national fund is exhausted. Thus, the
common fund is used only in large, systematic crisis, when the losses exceed the size
of the national insurance fund in a ex-ante determined 1-2 year timeframe. The aim
of re-insurance scheme is to stabilize and ensure confidence in the financial system.
Losses, in case of small and medium bank failures, would be completely covered
by the national part. Common funds should be used only when large, cross-border
banks or many smaller banks failed. The common fund would be financed by the
whole European banking sector by risk-based contribution at national level and built
up in a medium term (2-5 years period) (Gros & Schoenmaker, 2014). The ESM
could serve as a back-stop for the common deposit insurance fund.
The re-insurance would increase the credibility of the deposit insurance sub-
stantially in case of large, systematic shocks due to its greater size and shared
risks. This scenario would also be consistent with the supranational supervision of
the large, cross-border banks since losses emerged from the failure of these bank-
ing groups would be covered by a common fund. Nevertheless, this scheme's gov-
ernance efficiency is questionable and it carries some operational risk because of
the duplication of funds and complexitiy of the scheme (Schoenmaker, 2015). The
sovereign-banks loop would be also reduced, however not fully severed, by the par-
tial risk-sharing. Nevertheless, the risk-profile of the banks wouldn't be equal across
member states since banks would still face higher premiums whenever small and
medium banks failed.
The national part and the risk-based contribution at national level would en-
sure an incentive compatible system and limit moral hazard (Gros, 2013). Moreover,
the total amount of contribution can be capped and national funds can only receive
assistance when they have reached the required unified fund size. However, at least
partial fulfilment of the prerequisites is advisable since without them the govern-
ments wouldn't be incentivized to make systematic reforms in the financial sector
such as reduction of NPLs or sovereign debt holdings. In a re-insurance scheme,
different caps can be determined to limit the maximum contribution of the common
fund and to decide how much resources should be allocated to the national and to
the supranational fund. These caps could serve as further incentives for the govern-
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ments to pursue reforms. The combined size of the two layer fund system would be
similary to the current regulation 0.8% of the covered deposits.
8.4 Co-insurance
The co-insurance is a further step in risk-sharing. Compared to the re-insurance,
it shares the losses from the beginning in a pre-determined percentage. If this
percentage is 40%, then 60% of the losses is covered by the national part until
a given threshold, the remaining is paid by the common supranational fund. As
the national fund is depleted, the further losses are covered by the common fund.
However, similarly to the re-insurance, the amount of maximum contribution can
be also capped. These parameters greatly affect the risk-sharing. Similary, the
combined size of the national and supranational funds would be 0.8% of the covered
deposits. The allocation between the funds is important since ultimately this shows
the level of risk-sharing. The common fund is financed by all of the banks in the euro
area according to risk-based contribution relatively to all the other banks. Plainly,
the back-stop is the ESM.
This joint assumption of risk would further reduce the link between the
sovereign and banks, and would reduce the differences and funding costs between
the member states' banking sectors. The credibility of the deposit insurance across
Europe would further increase. It would be also consistent, however it similarly
carries some operational risk because of its complexitiy.
Nevertheless, the fulfilment of prerequisites are necessary for this step to
reduce the risk induced by moral hazard. A small national component (hardly
an incomplete coverage) would not ensure incentive compatible operation (Shavell,
1979).
This scenario can be an optimal transitional scheme, since it would ensure
the option to set progressively the percentages to finally become full insurance.
8.5 Full insurance
Full insurance would ensure complete risk-sharing in the euro area. It would func-
tion without any national fund thus redistributes risk across all the banks in the
banking union according to their risk profile. There would be only a common deposit
insurance fund equal to 0.8% of the covered deposits in the banking union. Every
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bank failure would be covered by a common fund. Again, the ESM could serve as
the back-stop. In this scenario, banks directly pay a risk-based premium relative
to all other banks in the eurozone into an European deposit insurance fund. All
the three objectives would be entirely achieved. The full insurance can provide the
most effective protection in case of asymmetric schoks. Nevertheless, without the
fulfilment of prerequisites, this option would create substantial moral hazard by giv-
ing the opportunity to member states to incentivez their banking sector to excessive
risk-taking since any loss would be covered by a common fund. This options would
be the most ideal for the European Union, however the prerequisites are necessary
for successful and incentive compatible operation.
8.6 Deposit Insurance Fund and Fiscal Back-stop
As systematic banking crises endanger all the European countries and involve huge
fiscal costs, arrangements for a common deposit insurance fund and fiscal back-stop
should be made. A robust and incentive compatible institutional set up is needed
for credibility of these arrangements to ensure depositors confidence.
In case of deposit insurance in Europe, the target level for ex-ante national
deposit insurance funds is 0.8% of the covered deposits per member states. This
could be the target level for a cost netural common fund which size then will be
around ¿43 billion2 in the eurozone. The resources from the national funds should
be transferred to the European fund to set up it without additional charges affecting
the financial sector. Gros and Schoenmaker (2014) analysed the capability of such
fund size. They argue that a common deposit insurance fund together with the
Single Resolution Fund would be able to cope with the failure even one of the largest
European banks or with the failure of several major banks at once. When this fund
is exhausted, banks should pay extraordinary ex-post contributions up to a certain
level, which does not endanger the financial situation of the healthy banks (European
Commission, 2015). The fund's financial means can include cash, deposits, low-risk
assets and partially payment commitments3, which can be liquidated within a short
2The Joint Research Centre of the EC estimated the amount of deposits in the eurozone in
2011. The total amount is close to ¿11,000 billion from which the covered deposits are around
¿4,150 billion (Cannas et al., 2015)
3Payment commitments are fully collateralised liabilities from banks toward the deposit insur-
ance fund. The collateral can be low risk assets without encumbered by third party. According to
the current regulation the share of payment commitments cannot exceed 30% of the total amount
of funds. (European Commission, 2010)
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time (European Commission, 2010).
To ensure an incentive compatible scheme, the contributions from banks must
be based on their risk level and the amount of covered deposits under their control.
The specification and calculation of the risk-adjusted fees are determined by the
European Banking Authority.
In a major financial crisis, a supranational back-stop is still necessary to
ensure the safety of the deposits since sovereigns might not serve as a reliable back
up. The back-stop should be based on ex-ante rules to be credible. Pisani-Ferry
and Wolff (2012) discusses three options for a common fiscal back-stop: an ex-
ante burden-sharing agreement, the European Stability Mechanism and a contingent
European taxation.
(i) European Stability Mechanism The ESM is an international financial
institution set up by euro area member states to assist them in severe financial
crises. It has ¿80 billion paid-in capital from member states and a lending
capacity of ¿500 billion raised by its own bond issuance (European Council,
2013). The main advantage of the ESM is that it is already in operation, has
a strong governance mechanism, and is capable to handle major crises too.
However, it has its own shortcomings. It would not be enough in exceptionally
large crisis affecting all euro area countries. Furthermore, per the current
regulation it cannot provide ex-ante guarantees which decreases its credibility
as a fiscal back-stop (European Council, 2013). The ESM treaty has to be
changes in order to the ESM to be able to automatically provide assistance
to the common deposit insurance scheme (Gros & Schoenmaker, 2014). The
maximum amount of contribution by ESM also can be capped to limit the
extensive risk-taking generated by moral hazard (Nieminen et al., 2016).
(ii) Ex-ante burden-sharing agreement Ex-ante agreement on burden-
sharing based on clear rules and governance structure could serve as a credible
back-stop. The rules should determine that in banking crisis how much of the
loss should be borne by European taxpayers and taxpayers in the member state
where the crisis occurred. Nevertheless, any agreement without pre-funding
can lose its credibility in severe distress as member states might withhold their
agreed part of the contribution (Pisani-Ferry & Wolff, 2012).
(iii) Contingent European taxation A contingent taxation proposed by
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff (2012) could be also a credible back-stop option. This
49
would have enough capacity to cover the costs of a major banking crisis. Even
a similar, but larger framework as the ESM can be built on it to issue debt
on favourable terms when it is necessary. Furthermore, this system would be
incentive compatible if all the member states have to contribute with suprana-
tional taxes to crisis resolution. Although, a contingent taxation might have
adverse consequences on economic activity. It could further deepen the crisis
by decreasing economic activity. Overall, this contingent taxation option is an
unlikely solution since the eurozone is not enough integrated politically.
In the short-term, the ESM could be the only viable back-stop for the common
deposit insurance fund since the two other options would require significant deepen-
ing of the euro area in terms of governance and democratic legitimacy (Pisani-Ferry
& Wolff, 2012).
8.7 Proposal of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme by
the European Commission
As the banking union is still incomplete and the depositors are still vulnerable
to large shocks, the European Commission has adopted a legislative proposal for
a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) on 24 November 2015 (European
Commission, 2015). The key principles of the proposal are to further reduce the
link between banks and their sovereigns, prevent bank runs and increase financial
stability without further increasing the burden on the banks. The EDIS would
achieve its objectives by pooling the available resources.
The European Deposit Insurance Fund would be established first to comple-
ment the national deposit guarantee funds. It would be gradually built up on the
current Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (2014/49/EU) to provide full protec-
tion and risk-sharing. During the 8 year transactional period (see Figure 3), the
first stage is the re-insurance, then co-insurance and finally the full insurance. After
the last stage, the national deposit insurance schemes would stay in place to ad-
minister the pay-outs according to the common regulations. The aim of the gradual
implementation is to ensure continuity and to reduce the moral hazard by making
sure that in the re-insurance phase the national funds are depleted first and in the
co-insurance the risk are shared only partially from the first loss.
The European Deposit Insurance Fund similarly to the existing national funds
would be based on risk-based contribution from banks and have a fund size equal to
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0.8% of the covered deposits in the banking union. It would be cost-neutral since the
banks will contribute to the EDIS than to the national deposit guarantee schemes.
However, when this common fund is depleted, the national deposit insurance schemes
and ultimately the national governments resposibility to serve as a fiscal back-stop
(European Commission, 2015).
According to the proposal, the central governing body of the EDIS would
be the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which is already established in the frame of
the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Single Resolution Board's task is to mon-
itor, manage potential conflict of interest and make swift decision to prevent any
contagion and financial instability. The SRB would manage the SRF and the EDIS
together to create synergies.
The EDIS would be based on the Single Rulebook, keep the current level of
protection (EUR 100,000), mandatory for all Euro area members and open also to
non-Euro area Member States (Stuchlik, 2016). In order to establish the EDIS, the
Commission has proposed to amend the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation
No 806/2014 (European Commission, 2015).
The proposal presented by the Commission haven't been adopted by the
European Parliament yet. It was put on hold due to the opposition of Germany and
many Northern European member state because their fear of the adverse effects of
moral hazard (Wolff, 2016). During the discussion of EDIS, in the European Council
and the Parliament, several, mostly technical concerns were mentioned regarding to
scope, stages and governance of EDIS (Lange, 2017).
8.7.1 Three evolving steps of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme
Per the proposal, the implementation of EDIS would have started in middle of 2017.
The three major phases of EDIS are re-insurance, which would last until 2020, co-
insurance until 2024 and then full insurance onward.
The re-insurance phase would provide assistance to the member states na-
tional deposit insurance funds only after those are depleted. The contributions to
pay-outs and resolutions cases would be caped to limit the exposure of the common
fund (European Commission, 2015).
In the co-insurance phase, the European deposit insurance fund would in-
creasingly share (see Figure 3) the costs from the first losses.
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The final phase would completely replace the national deposit insurance
scheme and would be the sole insurance scheme for eurozone banks (Lange, 2017).
It would cover all the liquidity needs and losses related to the deposit insurance
function.
During the transitional period, the annual contribution of the banking sector
to the EDIS fund would be on average around 0.1% of the covered deposits in
the banking union. In the meantime, the national schemes would continue to co-
exist alongside the EDIS, but the banks' required payment to the national deposit
insurance funds would decrease. The contribution will be based on banks risk profile
and would be set at European level compared to all other banks in the eurozone
from the start of the co-insurance phase (European Commission, 2015).
8.7.2 Effect analysis of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme
The Commission presented a detailed effect analysis in October 2016. The effect
analysis considers three alternatives of EDIS: mandatory lending, mandatory re-
insurance and full insurance. Co-insurance was not analysed. The authors view
it only as a transitional stage between re- and full insurance. All the considered
options represent an improvement compared to the current legislation (national
schemes with voluntary lending), however the objective of the banking union will
be completely achieved only by the full insurance.
In the mandatory lending scheme, the national deposit insurance funds just
provide liquidity up to a given threshold to other funds in the eurozone and aren't
subject to any loss as all the loans must be repaid. On the other hand, the mandatory
re-insurance and full insurance scheme are the same steady-state options as in the
EDIS proposal.
The authors considered three criteria in their analysis: risk absorption, effi-
ciency and cost neutrality, and limits on moral hazard. To test the risk absorption
capacity of the schemes (both in term liquidity and loss), the authors used bank
stressed scenarios4. The full insurance outperforms both other scenarios, while the
4The study uses unconsolidated balance sheet data of the European banks extracted from
Bankscope dataset. It calculates the probabilities of default through the SYMBOL (Systemic
Model of Banking Originated Losses) model developed by the European Commission's Joint Re-
search Center. This model simulates how shocks affect each bank and then aggregates the data to
see the impacts on the schemes. Both the immediate liquidity coverage ability and the long-run
loss absorption capacity were tested (European Commission, 2016)
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re-insurance provides better coverage than the mandatory lending. In terms of ef-
ficiency, the common fund offers the most balanced redistribution across euro area
banks (European Commission, 2016). Nevertheless, all the options are cost neutral
since they don't put additional burden on the financial sector. Against moral haz-
ard, mandatory lending offers the most protection by not sharing the losses. The
re-insurance also provides some protection by contributing only after the national
funds are depleted and capping the maximum amount of contribution to the national
funds' needs.
In another study, which was prepared and commissioned by the European
Parliament in April 2016, the authors test the resilience of the Banking Union frame-
work and identify the missing elements and the costs associated to them (Nieminen
et al., 2016). The study suggests, that in the event of a new sovereign debt crisis,
a common deposit insurance scheme would decrease the effect of deposit flight by
about ¿16 billion, and in case of a financial crisis by ¿49 billion. Furthermore,
in case of a major crisis, even if the Banking Union architecture fully in place to-
day with the EDIS and SRM, the framework would not be sufficient to adequately
mitigate the wide-ranging impacts without bailouts.
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9 Comparison of policy options
I assess and compare the above discussed options per the three defined objectives:
credibility, consistency, and risk-sharing. The four relevant policy options are credit
line to national funds, re-insurance, co-insurance and full insurance. All the four
options represents an improvement compared to the baseline scenario. In the analy-
sis, I focus on the incentive compatibility of the schemes and on the welfare effects.
Furthermore, as there is a trade-off between risk-sharing and moral hazard, I discuss
these issues together.
Credibility
The scheme should be credible mainly by having an adequate size fund and
sound fiscal back-stop.
The credit line to the national funds option would establish a robust fiscal
back-stop and satisfy the liquidity needs, however the losses eventually must be
covered by the national funds, which absolute size is still negligible compared to
a costs of major crisis. By comparison, a common fund combined with a fiscal
back-stop could be more credible in case of large, asymmetric shocks. It could more
effectively cover the failure of the banking sector of some member states. All the
re-, co- and full insurance would mean improvement compared to the credit line to
the national funds scheme. The full insurance scheme would be the most credible
since it would have the largest common fund, while the re-insurance is the least by
having the smallest supranational compartment.
Consistency
The scheme should be consistent and be able to make swift decision. It
needs to have an effective supranational governance to avoid conflicts with the also
supranational supervision and coordination failures arising from the bankruptcy of
the large cross-border banks.
The credit line to the nation funds scheme would still able to make swift
decisions, however without any supranational part of the deposit insurance, the
consistency problem still prevail. To ensure consistency, a central body should be
set up to coordinate actions and make swift decisions. All the re-, co- and full
insurance would ensure consistency; however, the re- and co-insurance would carry
operational risk since these schemes would be overly complicated.
Another aspect of the good governance is the decision-making capacity of
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the fiscal back-stop. The ESM in its current form would be able to make decisions
only cumbersomely. The ESM treaty should be modified to attach this mechanism
directly to a common fund (Véron, 2015).
Risk-sharing and moral hazard
The scheme should share the risks to break to adverse feedback loop between
banks and sovereigns, to decrease the fragmentation of the banking sector, and to
increase the credibility of the scheme.
Nevertheless, the design of a common deposit insurance scheme must balance
between risk-sharing and moral hazard. Alternatively, measures should be imple-
mented to reduce negative incentives or the capability of member states and banks
to take higher risks. Otherwise, extensive risk taking can lead to further crises in
the future.
In the credit line to the national funds option, the cost of failures will remain
in the country and the losses of the funds must be borne by the domestic banking
sector. The other three option would pool the risk to more effectively protect against
major crises. The re- and co-insurance would have a national part to limit the
negative incentives by the incomplete coverage (Shavell, 1979). The full insurance
would mean complete risk-sharing arising from covered deposits. However, to handle
the adverse incentives of the member states and banks some prerequisites should
be implemented. First, the legacy problems, such as the NPLs and the domestic
sovereign bond exposure should be solved. Then measures should be implemented
to approximate the banking sector's diverse risk levels per member states. Macro-
prudential policies affecting the banking sector must be unified.
Overall, the full insurance scheme would be the most ideal option, however
measures should be implemented to limit the moral hazard. Partial fulfilment of
prerequisites would make feasible to implement either re- or co-insurance. Without
satisfactorily handling the legacy problems, the credit line to the national funds
option should be installed.
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10 Implementation
A common deposit insurance scheme must have democratic legitimacy and account-
ability. Thus, it should be regulated per the European law and be held accountable
to the European Pairlament. The amendment of the Single Resolution Mechanism's
regulation would be sufficient to establish a common deposit insurance scheme.
There is no need for an Intergovernmental Agreement since the EU Treaty provides
adequate legal basis for the regulation (European Commission, 2015). It is impor-
tant that the common deposit insurance will be built up on a solid legal framework
to ensure a robust institutional scheme.
Nevertheless, from an economic point of view, the most important question is
how to set up an incentive compatible scheme. Should the European Central Bank
govern the newly formed deposit insurance scheme or an expanded Single Resolution
Fund should be responsible for it? What should be the reach of the scheme? Or
what should be the timetable of the implementation to already be in operation for
the subsequent major crisis without covering the current legacy problems? These
questions should be answered carefully to create a well-functioning scheme.
10.1 Transition
The common deposit insurance scheme should be set up gradually to ensure a con-
tinuous and incentive compatible operation. The transfer of functions from national
funds to the European one should be neutral without any winners or losers. The
prerequisites, and especially the legacy problems should be solved during the tran-
sitional period. The re- and co-insurance forms are great ways to cover this period.
They ensure both continuity by gradually allocating responsibilities between the
national and European funds and incentive compatible operation by keeping a na-
tional part thus limiting the moral hazard. Furthermore, not yet all the national
funds are set up as required by the European Union's Deposit Guarantee Scheme
Directive which again should be done before the full insurance phase (European Par-
liament, 2014a). The European Commission's proposal of the EDIS calculates with
a 8 years of transitional period. 3 years of re-insurance, 4 years of co-insurance and
then full insurance by gradually decreasing the responsibility of the national part
(European Commission, 2015). The contribution caps in the re- and co-insurance
schemes ensure that the common fund won't exhaust during the transition period.
Faster handling of the legacy problems (NPLs and sovereign bond exposure) would
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enable an even shorter, 3-5 years transition period (Gros & Schoenmaker, 2014).
10.2 Separate or combine deposit insurance with resolution
A common deposit insurance should be able to make swift decisions and have good
governance to be accountable and effective in coordinating actions. There is a policy
debate ongoing whether to combine the deposit insurance with the single resolution
function (Schoenmaker & Gros, 2012). Both in the United States and in Japan
these two functions are combined. The combination of the two function would avoid
conflicts between multiple agencies and could apply internally the least cost principle
in bank resolution. In resolution, the authorities need to choose between to take over
(and further operate the bank) or to liquidate (and pay-out depositors) (European
Commission, 2010). In a combined form, interventions such as recapitalization or
liquidity assistance might be a less costly solution and are more often considered.
These measures help to avoid contagion and maintain the operation of banks thus
eventually might the pay-out of the depositors is not necessary and even depositors
with deposits over ¿100,000 would not lose their uninsured share.
Primarily, the deposit insurance scheme and the resolution mechanism com-
plement each other to protect depositors thus their cooperation would be advisable
since their operation produce synergies (Schoenmaker & Gros, 2012). Beck and
Laeven (2006) also found in their large sample, cross-country empirical study that
separate deposit insurance and resolution mechanism can lead to inefficiencies and
co-ordination failures in bank resolution. On the other hand, if the two function is
combined, it can increase the stability of the banking system.
10.3 Governed by a separate authority or European Central
Bank
Another policy question is whether a common deposit insurance (and resolution)
scheme should be integrated into the European Central Bank. As shown by a
recent World Bank study, in most of the countries the deposit insurance scheme
is a legally separate unit from central banks (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013). The
theoretical argument in favour of a unique body is that information sharing about
the state of the economy and the banking sector will be smoother. However, the
integration may lead into excessive forbearance in bank resolution (Freixas & Rochet,
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2008). Repullo (2000) discusses this delegation problem extensively. He applies an
incomplete contract approach and argues that when the central bank (as a liquidity
provider) and a deposit insurance scheme are integrated, it is less likely that the
agency will decide to close a failing bank as vigorously as a stand-alone deposit
insurance scheme would act to protect depositors. Especially in case of large shocks
would the separation of the two authorities be optimal for the society. Furthermore,
since the ECB has also supervisory roles, it could create further conflicts . The ECB
may be subject to reguklatory capture and fear to act as a resolution authority to
avoid provoking panics in the market (Gros & Schoenmaker, 2014).
Thus, an independent common deposit insurance (and resolution) scheme
would be more optimal and could be established by European Union Regulation
and be accountable to the European Parliament. Similarly to the Single Resolution
Board (responsible for the operation of the Single Resolution Fund), a common
deposit insurance scheme could function as an independent agency (or combined
and supervised by SRB) based in Brussels, Belgium.
10.4 Scope of the common deposit insurance
A further policy question to be decided is whether all eurozone banks or only those
which are directly supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism should be cov-
ered by a common deposit insurance. The SSM supervises the most significant,
systematically important banks with substantial cross-border activity in the euro
area, and only oversees the supervision of the smaller financial institutions. To have
an incentive compatible scheme, it is important to keep the same geographical scope
for the supervision and deposit insurance functions. However, it is also the SSM's
responsibility to assure that all the banks are supervised per the common high stan-
dards and it has the power to directly take over the supervision of smaller banks
(Schoenmaker, 2015) thus even if all banks would be covered by a common deposit
insurance scheme that would be consistent and incentive compatible system. Fur-
thermore, massive failure of the smaller banks in a systematic crisis still could trigger
a bank panic and have substantial adverse effect on sovereigns. In such a setting,
there would be less diversified pooling of risks and smaller fund which would make
it substantially harder to handle a crisis. Without a supranational insurance, these
smaller financial institutions would partly preserve their national identity. More-
over, the banks just under or above the threshold to participate in the common
deposit insurance would raises several operational problems (Gros & Schoenmaker,
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2014). Thus, a common deposit insurance for all the eurozone banks would be more
optimal.
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11 Conclusion
A common deposit insurance scheme is the necessary, last element of the banking
union to genuinely break the vicious circle between banks and sovereign.
Nevertheless, to have a robust and incentive compatible European deposit
insurance system, it should fulfil the following objectives. It should have significant
size to credibly protect in case of large bank failures, be consistent (supervision and
deposit insurance on the same supranational level) and pool the risks to lessen the
fragmentation of the financial system across the eurozone.
Currently, the only feasible solution is either the mandatory lending between
the national deposit insurance funds or to indirectly link the ESM to the national
funds to provide credit because these options does not share risk between member
states. In medium-term (2-5 years) the optimal solution depends on the fulfilment of
prerequisites to cope with moral hazard. The necessary prerequisites are related to
the different macro-prudential policies and to the legacy of the recent crisis. Banks'
risks profile is still different across Europe to a certain degree because of their do-
mestic sovereign bond exposure and the varying amount of non-performing loans.
These problems should be handled before any substantial risk-sharing between mem-
ber states. Partial fulfilment of prerequisites would make feasible to implement a re-
and co-insurance scheme. However, the ideal solution would be the full insurance
for the eurozone to fully break the sovereign-bank loop. Thus, the introduction of
re-insurance should be the medium-term goal, full insurance a medium- or long-term
goal depending on the execution of the prerequisites.
A common deposit insurance should be established by gradually taking over
the role of the current national deposit insurance schemes and directly levying the
risk-based premiums on all the eurozone banks to build up its fund. This could
be done cost-neutrally since the premiums to national funds would decrease in the
meantime and finally cease after the end of the transition period. The common
scheme should be independent from the European Central Bank, however should
be managed jointly with the Single Resolution Fund. Moreover, a credible fiscal
back-stop should be attached to it. The ESM could serve as a fiscal back-stop,
nevertheless in an optimal case its treaty should be changed to be able to directly
give liquidity to the common fund.
The European Commission also realized the need for a common deposit insur-
ance and proposed the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (European Commission,
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2015). Compared to this proposal I would suggest broder emphasize and measures
to limit the potential moral hazard which on the long-term seriously can affect the
viability of the scheme and the cohesion of the European integration. These mea-
sures should handle the legacy problems (NPLs and soveregin bond exposure) and
unify the different macro-prudential policies which affect the banking sector's risk
level. In addition, I suggest to modify the ESM treay to be able to directly lend to
the common fund to increase its credibility.
A common deposit insurance can contribute to a more integrated and re-
silient European financial system. Furthermore, in crisis management, it would also
consider the cross-border externalities.
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